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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An 
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision To Not Object To 
Evidence Of The Witness's Explanation For His Prior Inconsistent Testimony 
A. The District Court Erred By Concluding That The Inadmissibility Of The 
Evidence Was Alone Sufficient To Sustain A Finding Of Deficient 
Performance Of Counsel 
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The court must apply a "strong 
presumption of competence." Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 
1388, 1407 (2011). To overcome the presumption of competence Cook had to 
prove that the strategic decision to not object "resulted from inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 
(2008). See also Hinton v. Alabama, _ U.S. _, 134 S.Ct. 1081, 1088-89 
(2014) (counsel's decision to not seek additional expert witness at state expense 
deficient because counsel was unaware of law allowing him to do so). 
The district court in this case did not find the "strong presumption" of 
competence disproved by evidence of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective review." Rather, it found 
that there is "no strategic reason to allow highly prejudicial evidence to be 
admitted if it could be excluded." (R., p. 396.) The district court found deficient 
performance exclusively upon its determination that the evidence it deemed 
prejudicial could have been excluded, but was not. Because the district court 
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found deficient performance without finding any objective shortcoming, it applied 
an erroneous legal standard and committed reversible error. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 6-8.) 
Cook argues the district court "not only set out the appropriate legal 
standard, but then concluded 'there is simply no strategic reason to allow highly 
inflammatory prejudicial evidence to be admitted if it could be excluded.'" 
(Respondent's brief, p. 3.) Cook cannot point out in the record, however, where 
the district court ever found an objective shortcoming of counsel, a prerequisite 
to concluding that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. The 
district court simply failed to make any factual finding, such as lack of 
preparation or ignorance of the law, that would actually support a conclusion that 
counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. 
The court did find that counsel could have objected and successfully 
excluded the "inflammatory" and "prejudicial" evidence. Such a finding is 
inadequate by itself to show deficient performance. See State v. Dunlap, 155 
Idaho 345, _,313 P.3d 1,40 (2013) (claimed failure to object to evidence not 
deficient performance absent evidence that the lack of objection was "the 
product of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law"). The district 
court did not "indulge the strong presumption that counsel made all significant 
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Pinholster, 
U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. at 1407 (internal quotes and brackets omitted). The 
standard actually applied by the district court, by which the petitioner may 
establish deficient performance merely by showing inadmissible evidence came 
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in at his trial, employed no presumption, required no proof of objective 
deficiency, and effectively required the state to prove that counsel was not 
deficient. Cook's argument that a showing of inadmissibility is sufficient to 
sustain his burden of proof is simply contrary to law. 
B. The District Court Erred By Failing To Consider Counsel's Stated 
Reasons For Not Objecting 
Defense counsel's stated reason for not objecting was because the 
evidence of the threats was "part and parcel of Mr. Nelson's testimony or 
contention." (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 13-16.) The district court considered whether 
the evidence would be admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, but 
failed to consider counsel's stated reason for not objecting. (R., p. 395.) The 
testimony regarding the threats was admissible to demonstrate the reasons for 
the witness's inconsistent statement at the preliminary hearing; therefore 
defense counsel reasonably concluded the evidence was admissible. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) 
Cook's response is that trial counsel "stated he believed that the threat 
evidence was admissible as part and parcel of a confession." (Respondent's 
brief, p. 5.) This representation is inaccurate. Counsel stated he was not 
objecting because testimony regarding the alleged threats was "part and parcel 
of Mr. Nelson's testimony or contention." (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 8-15.) He 
specifically stated, in response to whether there should be a limiting instruction, 
"I don't see that it's part of an alleged confession." (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 15-16 
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(emphasis added).) 1 Trial counsel specifically denied that the evidence of 
threats was "part and parcel" of any confession; the record clearly establishes 
that the evidence of threats was "part and parcel" of the witness's prior 
inconsistent testimony at the preliminary hearing. The law would not have 
allowed trial counsel to simultaneously impeach the witness with evidence of his 
prior inconsistent statements and deny the witness the opportunity to explain the 
inconsistency. Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 
(1968) ("It is settled that upon introduction of evidence which seemingly 
impeaches or contradicts a witness's testimony, the witness must be permitted a 
reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching evidence.") (cited at 
Appellant's brief, p. 11). 
In this case trial counsel elected to put the evidence (inconsistent 
statements and explanation that inconsistent statements were the result of 
threats) because he believed that the jury would ultimately conclude the witness 
was not credible. (Trial Tr., p. 108, Ls. 4-16.) Because keeping out the threat 
evidence would likely also have resulted in the exclusion of the inconsistent 
statement evidence, the election to put both before the jury instead of neither 
1 Cook is conflating trial counsel's statements in relation to two different parts of 
the evidence. Counsel did state that evidence of Cook's threats that he would 
harm the victim to prevent her from testifying was "an admission type statement." 
(Trial Tr., p., 114, Ls. 13-18 (cited at Respondent's brief, p. 5).) The district court 
found deficient performance for failing to object to evidence that "Cook 
threatened to rape Nelson's wife and daughter and that his family would be 
'taken care of' if he testified." (R., p. 295.) The district court did not address any 
failure to object to evidence of threats to harm the victim. (R., pp. 392-401.) 
Because the district court did not base any finding of deficient performance on 
any lack of objection to evidence of threats against the victim, such is beyond the 
scope of this appeal. 
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was a quintessential tactical decision. The court's conclusion that just because 
the evidence could have been excluded an objection must have been made is 
contrary to law. 
C. The District Court Erred In Its Prejudice Analysis 
The district court erred in two ways. First, by failing to recognize that the 
evidence of threats was relevant to explain the prior inconsistent statement it 
erred because the evidence was admissible on this ground or, alternatively, 
exclusion of the evidence of the explanation for the inconsistent statement would 
have resulted in exclusion of the inconsistent statements as well. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11-12.) Second, the district court's analysis focused on whether the 
jury would have "ignored" the evidence instead of whether, considering the trial 
as a whole, there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 12-13.) Because the district court failed to address the proper legal 
standards for admission of the challenged evidence and because it ultimately 
applied an incorrect prejudice analysis it erred and must be reversed. 
In response Cook adopts the district court's opinion and claims the "State 
failed to show the district court erred." (Respondent's brief, p. 6.) Application of 
the correct standards of admissibility of evidence, however, shows that the 
evidence of threats was admissible to explain the inconsistent testimony offered 
at the preliminary hearing, and that if the evidence had been excluded such 
would have foreclosed impeachment with the prior inconsistent testimony. 
Neither of these results was prejudicial to Cook. Likewise, the court's rationale is 
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flawed because the jury would not have "ignored" the testimony regarding the 
threats only if they found it credible, and if they found the witness' testimony 
credible they likely would have convicted anyway. The district court applied 
incorrect legal theories and reached an erroneous result. 
II. 
The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Analysis And Reached An 
Erroneous Conclusion Regarding Counsel's Tactical Decision In Relation To 
Evidence Of The Victim's Disclosure Of The Rape 
The record establishes that trial counsel affirmatively used evidence of the 
victim's disclosure to argue that the timing of the disclosure evinced fabrication 
and unreliability. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) Once again the district court 
erroneously concluded that a determination that the evidence was subject to 
objection established both prongs of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-19.) Cook has chosen to not respond to the state's 
argument. (See, generally, Respondent's brief.) For the reasons stated in the 
Appellant's brief, the district court erred. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order and judgment granting post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 20~. 
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